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Abstract
Adversarial training has shown effectiveness
and efficiency in improving the robustness
of deep neural networks for image classifica-
tion. For text classification, however, the dis-
crete property of the text input space makes
it hard to adapt the gradient-based adversar-
ial methods from the image domain. Exist-
ing text attack methods, moreover, are effec-
tive but not efficient enough to be incorpo-
rated into practical text adversarial training. In
this work, we propose a Fast Gradient Pro-
jection Method (FGPM) to generate text ad-
versarial examples based on synonym substi-
tution, where each substitution is scored by
the product of gradient magnitude and the pro-
jected distance between the original word and
the candidate word in the gradient direction.
Empirical evaluations demonstrate that FGPM
achieves similar attack performance and trans-
ferability when compared with competitive at-
tack baselines, at the same time it is about 20
times faster than the current fastest text attack
method. Such performance enables us to in-
corporate FGPM with adversarial training as
an effective defense method, and scale to large
neural networks and datasets. Experiments
show that the adversarial training with FGPM
(ATF) significantly improves the model robust-
ness, and blocks the transferability of adversar-
ial examples without any decay on the model
generalization.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have made great
success in recent years (Krizhevsky et al., 2012;
Kim, 2014; Devlin et al., 2019). However, re-
searchers have found that DNNs are often vul-
nerable to adversarial examples for image data
(Szegedy et al., 2014) as well as text data (Papernot
∗ The first three authors contribute equally.
† Corresponding author.
et al., 2016). In image domain, numerous methods
have been proposed with regard to adversarial at-
tack (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Athalye et al., 2018)
and defense (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Samangouei
et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2018). Among which, ad-
versarial training that adopts perturbed examples in
the training stage to promote the model robustness
is very popular and effective (Athalye et al., 2018).
In text domain, the lexical, grammatical and se-
mantic constraints and the discrete input space
make it much harder to craft adversarial exam-
ples. Current attack methods include character-
level attack (Liang et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019;
Ebrahimi et al., 2018), word-level attack (Papernot
et al., 2016; Samanta and Mehta, 2017; Gong et al.,
2018; Cheng et al., 2018; Kuleshov et al., 2018;
Neekhara et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2019; Wang et al.,
2019), and sentence-level attack (Iyyer et al., 2018;
Ribeiro et al., 2018). For character-level attack,
recent works (Pruthi et al., 2019) have shown that
a spell checker can easily fix the perturbations. It’s
worth noting that although Ebrahimi et al. (2018)
adapts HotFlip for word-level attack, they cannot
generate abundant adversarial examples due to the
syntactic and semantic constraints. Word-level at-
tacks, then, either face the challenge of semantic
preservation quality for the gradient-based pertur-
bations, or is time-consuming for the query-based
synonym substitution. Similarly, as sentence-level
attacks are usually based on paraphrasing, adver-
sary generation demands much longer time. There
exists a work (Miyato et al., 2016) that adopts
FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015) to perturb the
word embeddings, but such perturbations are di-
rectly used for enhancing the model performance
on the original data.
Adversarial defense for text data is much less
studied in the literature. Some works (Jia et al.,
2019; Huang et al., 2019) are based on interval
bound propagation (IBP), first proposed in image
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domain (Gowal et al., 2018; Dvijotham et al., 2018),
to ensure certifiable defense. Zhou et al. (2019) pro-
pose to learn to discriminate perturbations (DISP)
and restore the embedding of the original word for
defense without altering the training process or the
model structure. Wang et al. (2019) propose a Syn-
onym Encoding Method (SEM), which inserts an
encoder before the input layer to defend synonym
substitution based attacks. To our knowledge, ad-
versarial training, one of the most efficacious de-
fense approaches for images (Athalye et al., 2018),
has not been effectively implemented for text clas-
sification as a defense method.
Among different types of adversarial attacks,
existing synonym substitution based attack meth-
ods guarantee grammatical correctness and avoid
semantic changes, but are usually much less effi-
cient to be incorporated into adversarial training.
Gradient-based attacks, on the other hand, often
have much higher efficiency. Due to the discrete-
ness of the text input space, however, it is chal-
lenging to adopt such methods directly in the text
embedding space (Miyato et al., 2016) to gener-
ate meaningful adversarial examples and preserve
original semantics.
In this work, we propose a gradient-based adver-
sarial attack method, called Fast Gradient Projec-
tion Method (FGPM), for efficient text adversary
generation. Specifically, we approximate the clas-
sification confidence change caused by synonym
substitution by the product of the gradient magni-
tude and the projected distance between the orig-
inal word and the candidate word in the gradient
direction. At each iteration, we substitute a word
with its synonym that leads to the highest prod-
uct value. Compared with existing query-based
attack methods, FGPM only needs one time of
back-propagation calculation to obtain the gradi-
ent. As a result, FGPM is about 20 times faster
than the current fastest adversarial attack, making
it possible to incorporate FGPM with adversarial
training for efficient and effective defense in text
classification.
Extensive experiments on three standard datasets
demonstrate that FGPM can achieve similar at-
tack performance and transferability as state-of-the-
art synonym substitution based adversarial attacks
with much higher efficiency. More importantly,
empirical results show that our adversarial training
with FGPM (ATF) can promote the model robust-
ness against white-box as well as black-box adver-
sarial attacks, and effectively block the transferabil-
ity of adversarial examples without any decay on
the model generalization.
2 Related Work
For related work, we provide a brief overview on
text adversarial attacks and defenses on word-level.
2.1 Adversarial Attack
Adversarial attacks fall in two settings: (a) white-
box attack allows full access to the target model,
including model outputs, (hyper-)parameters, gra-
dients and architectures, and (b) black-box attack
only allows access to the model outputs.
Methods based on word embedding usually fall
in the white-box setting. Papernot et al. (2016) find
a word in dictionary such that the sign of the differ-
ence between the found word and original word is
closest to the sign of gradient. However, such word
does not necessarily preserve the semantic and/or
syntactic correctness and consistency. Gong et al.
(2018) further employ the Word Movers Distance
(WMD) in an attempt to preserve semantics. Cheng
et al. (2018) also propose an attack based on the
embedding space with additional constraints target-
ing seq2seq models. Our work similarly produces
efficient white-box attacks, while guaranteeing the
quality of adversarial examples by restricting the
perturbation to synonym substitution, which usu-
ally appears in black-box attacks.
In black-box setting, Kuleshov et al. (2018) pro-
pose a Greedy Search Attack (GSA) that perturbs
the input by synonym substitution. Specifically,
GSA greedily finds a synonym for replacement that
minimizes the model’s classification confidence.
Ren et al. (2019) propose a Probability Weighted
Word Saliency (PWWS) that greedily substitutes
each target word with a synonym determined by
the combination of classification confidence change
and word saliency. Alzantot et al. (2018) also use
synonym substitution and propose a population-
based algorithm called Genetic Algorithm (GA).
Wang et al. (2019) further propose an Improved
Genetic Algorithm (IGA) that allows to substitute
words in the same position more than once and
outperforms GA.
2.2 Adversarial Defense
Currently, there are a series of works (Miyato et al.,
2016; Sato et al., 2018; Barham and Feizi, 2019)
that perturbs the word embeddings, and utilize ad-
versarial training as a regularization strategy. These
works aim to improve the model performance on
the original dataset, but do not intend to defend the
adversarial attacks. Therefore, we do not take such
works into consideration in this paper.
A stream of recent popular defense methods (Jia
et al., 2019; Huang et al., 2019) focuses on ver-
ifiable robustness. They use IBP in the training
procedure to produce provably robust models to all
possible perturbations within the constraints. Such
endeavor, however, is currently time consuming in
the training stage as the authors noted (Jia et al.,
2019) and hard to be scaled to complex models
or large datasets. Zhou et al. (2019) train a per-
turbation discriminator that validates how likely a
token in the text is perturbed and an embedding
estimator that restores the embedding of the origi-
nal word to block adversarial attacks. Instead, our
work focuses on fast adversarial examples gener-
ation and easy-to-apply defense method for large
neural networks and datasets.
Alzantot et al. (2018) and Ren et al. (2019) adopt
the adversarial examples generated by their attack
methods for adversarial training and achieve some
robustness improvement. Unfortunately, due to the
relatively low efficiency of generating adversaries,
they are unable to craft plenty of perturbations dur-
ing the training to ensure significant robustness im-
provement. To our knowledge, adversarial training
has not been practically applied for text classifica-
tion as an efficient and effective defense method.
Wang et al. (2019) propose a Synonym Encoding
Method (SEM) that uses a synonym encoder to map
all the synonyms to the same code in the embedding
space and force the classification to be smoother.
Trained with the encoder, their model also obtains
significant improvement on the robustness with a
little decay on the model generalization.
3 Fast Gradient Projection Method
In this section, we formalize the definition of adver-
sarial examples for text classification and describe
in detail the proposed adversarial attack method,
Fast Gradient Projection Method (FGPM).
3.1 Text Adversarial Examples
Let X denote the input space containing all the
possible input texts and Y = {y1, · · · , ym} the
output space. Let x = {w1, · · · , wi, · · · , wn} ∈
X denote an input sample consisting of n words
and D the dictionary containing all the possible
words in the input texts. A classifier φ is expected
to learn a mapping X → Y so that for any sample
x, the predicted label φ(x) equals its true label y
with high probability. Let F (x, y) denote the logit
output of classifier φ on category y. The adversary
adds an imperceptible perturbation ∆x on x to
craft an adversarial example xadv that misleads the
classifier φ:
φ(xadv) 6= φ(x) = y, xadv = x+ ∆x
s.t. ‖∆x‖p ≤ ,
where  is a hyper-parameter denoting the pertur-
bation upper bound. ‖·‖p is the Lp-norm distance
metric which usually denotes the word substitution
ratioR(x, xadv) as the measure for the perturbation
caused by synonym substitution:
R(x, xadv) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1wi 6=w′i(wi, w
′
i).
Here 1wi 6=w′i is an indicator function, wi ∈ x and
w′i ∈ xadv.
3.2 Generating Adversarial Examples
Mrki et al. (2016) have shown that counter-fitting
can help remove antonyms which are also consid-
ered as “similar words” in the original GloVe vector
space to improve the vectors capability of indicat-
ing semantic similarity. Thus, we post-process the
GloVe vectors by counter-fitting and define a syn-
onym set for each word wi ∈ x in the embedding
space as follows:
S(wi, δ) = {wˆi ∈ D | ‖wˆi − wi‖2 ≤ δ}, (1)
where δ is a hyper-parameter that constrains the
maximum Euclidean distance for synonyms in the
embedding space. As in Wang et al. (2019), we set
δ = 0.5 in our experiments.
Once we have the synonym set S(wi, δ) for each
word wi, the most important issues then lie in the
synonym selection and replacement order determi-
nation.
Word Substitution. As shown in Figure 1 (a),
for each word wi, we wish to pick a word wˆ∗i ∈
S(wi, δ) that earns the most benefit to the overall
substitution process, which we call the optimal
synonym. Due to the high complexity of finding
the optimal synonym, previous works (Ren et al.,
2019; Wang et al., 2019) greedily pick a synonym
wˆ∗i ∈ S(wi, δ) that minimizes the classification
confidence:
wˆ∗i = arg max
wˆji∈S(wi,δ)
(F (x, y)− F (xˆj , y)),
Figure 1: Strategies to pick the most suitable synonym
to substitute word wi. (a) Pick a synonym wˆ∗i that min-
imizes the classification confidence among all the syn-
onyms wˆji ∈ S(wi, δ). (b) Pick a synonym wˆ∗i that
maximizes the product of the magnitude of gradient
and the projected distance between wˆ∗i and wi in the
gradient direction.
where xˆj = {w1, · · · , wi−1, wˆji , wi+1, · · · , wn}.
However, the selection process is time consuming
as picking such a wˆ∗i needs |S(wi, δ)| queries on
the model. To reduce the calculation complexity,
based on the local linearity of deep models, we use
the product of the magnitude of gradient and the
projected distance between two synonyms in the
gradient direction in the word embedding space to
estimate the amount of change for the classification
confidence. Specificallt, as illustrated in Figure 1
(b), we first calculate the gradient ∇wiJ(θ, x, y)
for each word wi where J(θ, x, y) is the loss func-
tion used for training. Then, we estimate the
change by calculating (wˆji − wi) · ∇wiJ(θ, x, y).
To determine the optimal synonym wˆ∗i , we choose
a synonym with the maximum product value:
wˆ∗i = arg max
wˆji∈S(wi,δ)
(wˆji − wi) · ∇wiJ(θ, x, y). (2)
Substitution Order. For each word wi in text
x = {w1, · · · , wi, · · · , wn}, we use the above
word substitution strategy to choose its optimal
substitution synonym, and obtain a candidate set
Cs = {wˆ∗1, · · · , wˆ∗i , · · · , wˆ∗n}. Then, we need to
determine which word in x should be substituted.
Similar to the word substitution strategy, we pick a
word wˆ∗i that has the biggest perturbation value pro-
jected in the gradient direction to substitute wi ∈ x:
wˆ∗ = arg max
wˆ∗j∈Cs
(wˆ∗j − wj) · ∇wjJ(θ, x, y). (3)
In summary, to generate an adversarial example,
we adopt the above word replacement and substitu-
tion order strategies for synonym substitution and
Algorithm 1 The FGPM Algorithm
Input: Benign sample x = {w1, · · ·, wi, · · ·, wn}
Input: True label y for x
Input: Target classifier, φ
Input: Upper bound distance for synonyms, δ
Input: Maximum number of iterations, N
Input: Upper bound for word substitution ratio, 
Output: Adversarial example xadv
1: Initialize x0adv = x
2: Calculate S(wi, δ) by Eq. (1) for wi ∈ x0adv
3: for k = 1→ N do
4: Construct the candidate set Cs =
{wˆ∗1, · · · , wˆ∗i , · · · , wˆ∗n} by Eq. (2)
5: Calculate optimal word wˆ∗ by Eq. (3)
6: Substitute w∗ ∈ xk−1adv with wˆ∗ to get xkadv
7: if φ(xkadv) 6= y and R(xkadv, x) <  then
8: return xkadv . Succeed
9: end if
10: end for
11: return None . Failed
do word substitution iteratively till the classifier
makes a wrong prediction. The overall FGPM al-
gorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
In order to avoid the semantic drift caused by
multiple substitutions at the same position of the
text, we construct a candidate synonym set for
the original sentence and constrain all the substi-
tutions with word wi ∈ x to the set, as shown
at line 2 of Algorithm 1. We also set the up-
per bound for word substitution ratio  = 0.25
in our experiments. Note that at each itera-
tion, FGPM just calculates the gradient by back-
propagation once, while previous query-based ad-
versarial attacks need
∑n
i=1 |S(wi, δ)| times of
model queries (Kuleshov et al., 2018; Ren et al.,
2019; Wang et al., 2019). We will show in experi-
ments that FGPM is much more efficient.
4 Adversarial Training with FGPM
Previous works (Alzantot et al., 2018; Ren et al.,
2019) have shown incorporating their attack meth-
ods into adversarial training (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) can improve the model robustness. Never-
theless, the improvement is limited. We argue that
adversarial training requires plenty of adversarial
examples generated based on current model param-
eters for better robustness enhancement. Due to the
inefficiency of text adversary generation, existing
text attack methods based on synonym substitution
AG’s News DBPedia Yahoo! Answers
CNN LSTM Bi-LSTM CNN LSTM Bi-LSTM CNN LSTM Bi-LSTM
No Attack† 92.3 92.6 92.5 98.7 98.8 99.0 72.3 75.1 74.9
No Attack 87.5 90.5 88.5 99.5 99.0 99.0 71.5 72.5 73.5
Papernot et al. 67.0 61.0 63.0 83.0 78.5 86.5 34.0 37.5 34.0
GSA 38.0 33.0 37.5 66.5 58.5 64.0 19.5 19.0 18.0
PWWS 29.0 29.5 29.0 51.5 49.0 49.5 3.5 14.0 10.5
IGA 26.0 23.5 26.5 34.5 32.5 33.5 4.5 6.5 7.0
FGPM 28.5 30.5 30.5 33.0 43.0 47.0 4.5 15.5 10.0
Table 1: The classification accuracy (%) of different classification models under various competitive adversarial
attacks. The first two rows of No Attack† and No Attack show the model accuracy on the entire original test set and
the sampled examples respectively. The lowest classification accuracy among the attacks is highlighted in bold to
indicate the best attack effectiveness. The second lowest classification accuracy is highlighted in underline.
could not provide sufficient adversarial examples
for adversarial training. With the high efficiency of
FGPM, we propose to adopt adversarial training
with FGPM (ATF) to effectively improve the model
robustness for text classification.
Specifically, we modify the objective function as
follows:
J˜(θ, x, y) = αJ(θ, x, y) + (1− α)J(θ, xadv, y),
where xadv is the adversarial example of each x
generated by FGPM based on the current model pa-
rameters θ. In all our experiments, we set α = 0.5
but other values may also work. As in Goodfel-
low et al. (2015), we treat FGPM as an effective
regularizer to improve the model robustness rather
than just adding a portion of adversarial examples
of the already trained model into the training set
and retrain the model.
5 Experimental Results
We empirically evaluate the proposed FGPM with
four state-of-the-art adversarial attack methods on
three popular benchmark datasets involving three
different neural networks. Experimental results
demonstrate that FGPM can achieve similar attack
performance and transferability as the best perform-
ing algorithms among the baselines, and with much
higher efficiency. Such performance enables us to
implement Adversarial Training with FGPM (ATF),
as a defense approach, which can be easily scaled
to large neural networks and datasets. We compare
ATF with recent two competitive defense methods,
and show that ATF not only can improve the model
robustness against white-box and black-box adver-
sarial attacks but also block the transferability of
adversarial examples more successfully without
any decay on the model generalization.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We first provide an overview of experimental setup,
including baselines, datasets and classification
models used in experiments.
Baselines. To evaluate the effectiveness of the
proposed attack, we compare FGPM with four re-
cent adversarial attacks, Papernot et al. (Papernot
et al., 2016), GSA (Kuleshov et al., 2018), PWWS
(Ren et al., 2019), and IGA (Wang et al., 2019).
Furthermore, to evaluate the defense performance
of our ATF, we take two competitive text defense
methods, SEM (Wang et al., 2019) and IBP (Jia
et al., 2019), against several recent word-level at-
tacks. Due to the low efficiency of the attack base-
lines, we randomly sample 200 examples on each
dataset, and generate adversarial examples by these
attack methods for different models with or without
defense.
Datasets. We compare the proposed methods
with baselines on three widely used benchmark
datasets including AG’s News, DBPedia ontology
and Yahoo! Answers (Zhang et al., 2015). AG’s
News dataset consists of news articles pertain-
ing four classes: World, Sports, Business and
Sci/Tech. Each class includes 30,000 training ex-
amples and 1,900 testing examples. DBPedia on-
tology dataset is constructed by picking 14 non-
overlapping classes from DBpedia 2014, which is
a crowd-sourced community effort to extract struc-
tured information from Wikipedia. For each of
the 14 ontology classes, there are 40,000 training
samples and 5,000 testing samples. Yahoo! An-
CNN LSTM Bi-LSTM CNN LSTM Bi-LSTM CNN LSTM Bi-LSTM
Papernot et al. 83.0* 89.0 89.5 93.5 78.5* 90.5 93.5 87.5 86.5*
GSA 66.5* 90.0 92.0 94.5 58.5* 91.5 94.0 86.5 64.0*
PWWS 51.5* 86.0 89.0 87.0 49.0* 86.5 86.0 75.0 49.5*
IGA 34.5* 83.0 88.5 90.5 32.5* 88.5 91.5 84.0 33.5*
FGPM 33.0* 82.5 91.0 90.5 43.0* 87.0 91.0 80.5 47.0*
Table 2: The classification accuracy (%) of different classification models for adversarial examples generated on
other models on DBPedia for the transferability evaluation. * indicates that the adversarial examples are generated
based on this model. The lowest classification accuracy among various attacks is highlighted in bold to indicate
the best transferability. The second lowest classification accuracy is highlighted in underline.
AG’s News DBPedia Yahoo! Answers
CNN LSTM Bi-LSTM CNN LSTM Bi-LSTM CNN LSTM Bi-LSTM
Papernot et al. 74 1,676 4,401 145 2,119 6,011 120 9,719 19,211
GSA 276 643 713 616 1,006 1,173 1,257 2,234 2,440
PWWS 122 28,203 28,298 204 34,753 35,388 643 98,141 100,314
IGA 965 47,142 91,331 1,369 69,770 74,376 893 132,044 123,976
FGPM 8 29 29 8 34 33 26 193 199
Table 3: Comparison on the total running times (in seconds) in generating 200 adversarial instances, evaluated on
various models and datasets.
swers dataset is a topic classification dataset with
10 classes, and each class contains 140,000 training
samples and 5,000 testing samples.
Models. We adopt several deep learning mod-
els that can achieve state-of-the-art performance
on text classification tasks, including Convolution
Neural Networks (CNNs) and Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNNs). The embedding dimension of
all models is 300 (Mikolov et al., 2013). Specifi-
cally, we replicate a CNN model from Kim (2014),
which consists of three convolutional layers with
filter size of 5, 4, and 3 respectively, a dropout
layer and a final fully connected layer. We also
use LSTM model which replaces the three convolu-
tional layers of the CNN with three LSTM layers,
each with 128 cells (Liu et al., 2016). Lastly, we im-
plement a Bi-LSTM model that replaces the three
LSTM layers of the LSTM with a bi-directional
LSTM layer having 128 forward direction cells and
128 backward direction cells.
5.2 Evaluation on Attack Effectiveness
To evaluate the attack effectiveness, we compare
FGPM with the baselines in two aspects, namely
classification accuracy under attacks and transfer-
ability.
Classification Accuracy under Attacks. In Ta-
ble 1, we provide the classification accuracy un-
der FGPM and the competitive baseline attacks on
three standard datasets. The more effective the at-
tack method is, the more the classification accuracy
the target model drops. We observe that FGPM re-
duces more of the classification accuracy than other
methods on CNN with DBPedia dataset, and has
close results on other cases when compared with
the best query-based methods. On average, the clas-
sification accuracy on the three datasets is reduced
by 59.0%, 58.2% and 62.5% respectively under
FGPM attack. Note that, compared with Papernot
et al., the only gradient-based adversarial attack
among the baselines, FGPM can reduce the classi-
fication accuracy by more than 33.8%, 41.7% and
25.2% respectively on the three datasets, indicating
that the proposed gradient projection technique sig-
nificantly improves the effectiveness of white-box
word-level attacks.
Transferability. The transferability of adversar-
ial attack refers to the ability to reduce the classifi-
cation accuracy of different models with adversar-
ial examples generated on a specific model (Good-
fellow et al., 2015), which is another serious threat
in real-world applications. To illustrate the transfer-
ability of FGPM, we generate adversarial examples
on each model by different attack methods and
Dataset Attack CNN LSTM Bi-LSTM
NT SEM IBP ATF NT SEM IBP ATF NT SEM IBP ATF
AG’s
News
No Attack† 92.3 89.7 90.2 92.6 92.6 90.9 89.0 92.5 92.5 91.4 90.0 92.8
No Attack 87.5 87.5 84.5 89.0 90.5 90.5 90.5 89.5 88.5 91.0 87.5 89.5
Papernot et al. 67.0 75.0 87.5 84.5 61.0 79.5 61.0 88.0 63.0 79.5 85.0 88.0
GSA 38.0 75.0 85.0 79.0 33.0 83.0 2.5 84.5 37.5 81.0 82.0 86.0
PWWS 29.0 76.0 84.0 79.5 33.5 84.0 14.0 84.5 29.0 83.0 75.5 85.5
IGA 26.0 77.5 84.0 77.5 23.5 85.0 1.5 83.0 26.5 82.5 75.0 86.5
FGPM 28.5 78.0 84.5 80.0 30.5 84.5 63.0 83.5 30.5 81.5 77.0 83.5
DBPedia
No Attack† 98.7 98.1 98.2 98.8 98.8 98.5 89.6 99.0 99.0 98.8 93.7 99.0
No Attack 99.5 97.5 98.0 100.0 99.0 99.5 90.0 100.0 99.0 98.0 93.0 100.0
Papernot et al. 83.0 86.5 97.0 99.5 78.5 95.0 53.5 99.5 86.5 91.5 93.0 100.0
GSA 66.5 90.0 96.5 98.0 58.5 95.5 0.0 99.0 64.0 91.5 91.5 100.0
PWWS 51.5 88.5 95.0 97.0 49.0 96.0 0.5 99.0 49.5 91.5 91.0 99.5
IGA 34.5 90.0 95.0 97.5 32.5 97.5 0.0 99.0 33.5 94.5 91.0 99.5
FGPM 33.0 88.5 96.0 98.0 43.0 96.5 49.0 99.0 47.0 93.0 91.0 99.5
Yahoo!
Answers
No Attack† 72.3 70.0 66.6 72.7 75.1 72.8 66.2 74.7 74.9 72.9 66.9 74.7
No Attack 71.5 67.0 65.0 69.0 72.5 69.5 66.5 74.5 73.5 69.5 70.5 73.5
Papernot et al. 34.0 52.5 64.0 65.5 37.5 56.5 47.5 67.5 34.0 62.5 1.5 67.5
GSA 19.5 52.5 61.5 53.0 19.0 51.5 39.5 60.5 18.0 51.5 28.0 58.0
PWWS 3.5 51.5 60.5 53.5 14.0 54.5 15.5 62.0 10.5 54.5 3.5 58.5
IGA 4.5 56.5 60.5 53.0 6.5 56.5 12.5 58.0 7.0 57.0 5.0 57.5
FGPM 4.5 56.5 60.0 57.0 15.5 57.5 37.5 63.5 10.0 59.5 1.5 61.0
Table 4: The classification accuracy (%) of three competitive defense methods under various adversarial attacks
on the same set of 200 randomly selected samples for the three standard datasets. The classification accuracy is in
red and italic when it is lower than NT. Notation: NT — Normal Training, SEM — Synonyms Encoding Method,
IBP — Training with Interval Bound Propagation, ATF — Adversarial Training with FGPM.
evaluate the classification accuracy of other models
on these adversarial examples. Here, we evaluate
the transferability of different attacks on DBPedia.
As depicted in Table 2, the adversarial examples
crafted by FGPM generally yield the second best
transferability.
5.3 Evaluation on Attack Efficiency
The attack efficiency is also important for evalu-
ating attack methods, especially if we would like
to incorporate the attacks into adversarial training
as a defense method. Adversarial training needs
highly efficient adversary generation so as to effec-
tively promote the model robustness. Therefore,
we evaluate the total time (in seconds) of generat-
ing 200 examples on the three datasets by various
attacks. As shown in Table 3, the average time
of generating 200 examples by FGPM is nearly
20 times faster than GSA, the second fastest at-
tack based on synonym substitution but with worse
attack performance and lower transferability than
FGPM. Moreover, FGPM is on average 970 times
faster than IGA, which has the best degradation
of the classification accuracy among the baselines.
Though Papernot et al. (2016) craft adversarial ex-
amples based on gradient and could make each
iteration faster, it needs much more iterations to
obtain adversarial examples due to a relatively low
attack effectiveness. On average, FGPM is about
78 times faster than Papernot et al..
5.4 Evaluation on Adversarial Training
From the above analysis, we see that compared
with the competitive attack baselines, FGPM can
achieve good attack performance and transferabil-
ity with much higher efficiency. Such performance
enables us to implement effective adversarial train-
ing and scale to large neural networks and datasets.
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of
ATF and do comparison with SEM and IBP against
adversarial examples generated by the above com-
petitive attacks. Here we focus on two sides,
defense against adversarial attacks and defense
against transferability.
Defense against Adversarial Attacks. We use
the above attacks on models trained by various de-
fense methods to evaluate the defense performance.
The results are shown in Table 4. For normal train-
ing (NT), the classification accuracy of the models
on all datasets drops dramatically under different
adversarial attacks. In contrast, both SEM and ATF
can promote the model robustness stably and effec-
tively among all models and datasets. Note that IBP
has distinctly better defense performance on CNNs
Attack CNN LSTM Bi-LSTM
NT SEM IBP ATF NT SEM IBP ATF NT SEM IBP ATF
Papernot et al. 83.0* 97.5 97.0 100.0 89.0 98.0 86.0 100.0 89.5 96.0 93.5 100.0
GSA 66.5* 97.0 97.0 100.0 90.0 99.5 85.5 100.0 92.0 98.0 93.0 100.0
PWWS 51.5* 97.0 97.0 100.0 86.0 99.5 87.0 100.0 89.0 98.0 92.5 100.0
IGA 34.5* 97.0 97.0 100.0 83.0 99.5 86.5 100.0 88.5 98.0 92.5 100.0
FGPM 33.0* 97.0 97.0 100.0 82.5 99.0 84.5 100.0 91.0 97.5 93.5 100.0
Papernot et al. 93.5 96.5 96.5 100.0 78.5* 98.5 83.5 100.0 90.5 97.0 94.0 100.0
GSA 94.5 97.5 96.5 100.0 58.5* 99.5 86.0 99.5 91.5 98.5 93.5 100.0
PWWS 87.0 97.5 97.5 100.0 49.0* 99.5 88.0 99.5 86.5 98.0 92.5 100.0
IGA 90.5 97.0 97.0 100.0 32.5* 99.5 86.5 99.5 88.5 98.0 93.0 100.0
FGPM 90.5 96.5 97.5 100.0 43.0* 99.5 86.0 100.0 87.0 97.5 92.5 100.0
Papernot et al. 93.5 96.5 97.0 100.0 87.5 98.5 85.5 100.0 86.5* 96.5 93.5 100.0
GSA 94.0 97.5 97.5 100.0 86.5 99.5 87.0 100.0 64.0* 98.0 93.0 100.0
PWWS 86.0 98.0 97.5 100.0 75.0 99.5 88.0 100.0 49.5* 98.0 93.0 100.0
IGA 91.5 97.0 97.5 100.0 84.0 99.5 87.0 100.0 33.5* 98.0 93.0 100.0
FGPM 91.0 97.5 97.5 100.0 80.5 99.5 86.5 100.0 47.0* 98.0 93.5 100.0
Table 5: The classification accuracy (%) of different classification models under competitive defenses for adversar-
ial examples generated on other models on DBPedia for evaluating the defense performance against transferability.
because of its theoretical certification. However,
with many restrictions added on the architectures,
the model hardly converges when trained on the
three-layer LSTM architecture and large dataset
like Yahoo! Answers, resulting in both weakened
generalization and adversarial robustness instead.
In some cases, IBP even achieves poorer robustness
than NT. Compared with SEM, moreover, ATF can
achieve higher classification accuracy under almost
all adversarial attacks on the three datasets. Espe-
cially on DBPedia, ATF can block almost all the
adversarial examples and achieve 100.0% or nearly
100.0% classification accuracy. Besides, both SEM
and IBP bring some decay on benign data. As a
way of data augmentation, however, ATF can im-
prove the model performance on benign examples
in most cases.
Defense against Transferability. As transfer-
ability poses a serious concern in real world appli-
cations, a good defense method should not only
defend the adversarial attack but also resist the ad-
versarial transferability. To evaluate the ability of
blocking the transferability of adversarial examples,
we evaluate each model’s classification accuracy
on adversarial examples generated by different at-
tacks methods under normal training on DBPedia.
As shown in Table 5, ATF blocks the transferability
of adversarial examples much more successfully
than normal training and the defense baselines.
In summary, ATF can promote the model robust-
ness against both white-box and black-box adver-
sarial attacks. When applied to complex models
and large datasets, ATF keeps stable and effective
performance. ATF can further block the transfer-
ability of adversarial examples more successfully
with no decay on the classification accuracy on
benign data.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we propose an efficient gradient
based synonym substitution adversarial attack
method, called Fast Gradient Projection Method
(FGPM), which approximates the classification
change caused by synonym substitution by the
product of the gradient magnitude and the pro-
jected distance in the gradient direction of the orig-
inal word and the candidate synonym. Empiri-
cal evaluations on three widely used benchmark
datasets demonstrate that FGPM can achieve close
attack performance and transferability as state-of-
the-art synonym-substitution based adversarial at-
tack methods.
More importantly, FGPM is about 20 times faster
than the current fastest synonym substitution based
adversarial attack method. With such high effi-
ciency, we introduce an effective defense approach
called Adversarial Training with FGPM (ATF) for
text classification. Extensive experiments show
that ATF can promote the model robustness against
white-box as well as black-box adversarial attacks,
and block the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples effectively without any accuracy decay on be-
nign data.
In future work, we plan to extend FGPM and
ATF to other NLP tasks (e.g. Machine Translation,
Question Answering) to evaluate the robustness of
sequence to sequence models. Moreover, consid-
ering the success of adversarial training in image
domain, we wish our work could inspire more re-
search of adversarial training in the text domain.
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